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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Idaho Woolgrowers Association, Frank Shirts, Jr., and the Shirts Brothers 
("Woolgrowers"), in reply to the brief by the State of Idaho and the Idaho Department of Fish & 
Game ("IDFG"), would like to remind the Court what this case involves and what it does not 
involve. It does not involve an argument regarding the dispute as to whether there is valid scientific 
proof establishing any means of disease transmission between domestic sheep and bighorn sheep. It 
does not involve an argument that the United States Forest Service cannot modifY Federal grazing 
permits or that the State of Idaho can prevent the Forest Service from modifYing those permits. It 
does not involve a debate whether reintroduction of bighorn sheep into areas where they have not 
lived for fifty years at the behest ofthe Federal Government was a wise decision. 
Rather, this case is at bottom an inquiry into whether the State of Idaho and its agencies can 
be required to live up to a promise they made to certain citizens of the State. It is a case involving 
interpretation of a statute passed by the Idaho Legislature to endorse a promise the State agency 
made and implement the agreement it entered into with those citizens. But on a more fundamental 
level, this appeal involves the question whether a district court can dismiss a claim against IDFG at 
a very preliminary stage of the litigation without considering any evidence or any testimony. 
If this Court does consider the substance of the dispute, it should be aware that the 
Woolgrowers' argument is not simply that a third party (the U.S. Forest Service) took an action and 
caused losses and therefore IDFG should remedy the damage, but also that IDFG had an affirmative 
duty to act. The Letter Agreement obligated IDFG to act when the Forest Service acted so as to 
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reduce further losses to bighorns without adversely impacting the domestic sheep operators. This 
activity could have included removal of the bighorns (since the State contends that it owns all 
wildlife in Idaho), providing alternative grazing for the Woolgrowers, or other action. Instead, 
IDFG did nothing - in violation of the Letter Agreement. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The parties are generally in agreement that the Woolgrowers' Amended Complaint sets out 
the pertinent facts. IDFG admits that the State controls wild animals within the State boundaries 
and therefore the Federal Forest Service could only engage in the reintroduction of bighorn sheep in 
Hells Canyon with IDFG's permission. IDFG admits that Idaho "recognizes sheep grazing on 
federal lands as an important economic activity .... " (Respondents' Brief at 1.) IDFG admits that it 
engaged in a cooperative project with the Forest Service to introduce bighorn sheep to Hells Canyon 
and that it signed a Letter Agreement directed to the Idaho Wool Growers Association in March of 
1997. IDFG does not dispute that the Letter Agreement was executed in return for the 
Woolgrowers' agreement to cease opposition to and support the reintroduction effort. IDFG does 
not dispute that soon after the Letter Agreement was executed by IDFG, the Idaho Legislature 
enacted and implemented through an emergency clause in 1997 an amendment to Idaho Code § 
36-106(e) that states it "is the policy of the state of Idaho that existing sheep or livestock 
operations in the area of any bighorn sheep transplant or relocation are recognized and that the 
potential risk, if any, of disease transmission and loss of bighorn sheep when the same invade 
domestic livestock or sheep operations is accepted. IDFG also admits after the Forest Service 
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ignored its own promises in the 1997 Letter Agreement and began to modify the Woolgrowers' 
grazing leases. Finally, IDFG acknowledges that the Idaho Legislature in 2009 recognized its 
obligations from the Letter Agreement and further amended Idaho Code § 36-1 06( e) requiring 
IDFG to develop best management practices for the grazing allotments. See the House and Senate 
Committee minutes, especially http://legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2009/standing. 
III. LEGAL ARGUMENT 
A. Granting the Motion to Dismiss Was Improper. 
With that factual background, the district court nevertheless granted IDFG's Motion to 
Dismiss. The Woolgrowers' opening brief set out the very strict standards imposed on a court 
considering a motion to dismiss as well as the standard of appellate review. IDFG's response to this 
procedural argument is to cite the recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which decisions remain controversial even within the 
Federal system. More importantly, those decisions, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), and 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), have never been adopted by this Court and 
indeed apparently never have even been cited by this Court. This Court's marching orders remain 
that the issue that a district court must review is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but 
whether the party is entitled to offer evidence to support its claim. Allied Bail Bonds, Inc. v. County 
of Kootenai, _ P.3 rd_, 2011 WL 2652475 (Idaho 2011). As a matter of fact, this Court on July 
11,2011 restated the standard to consider a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6): 
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"[A] district court's dismissal of a complaint under LR.C.P. 12(b )(6) shall be 
reviewed de novo." Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 832,243 P.3d 642, 648 
(2010). The Court on appeal must determine "whether the non-movant has alleged 
sufficient facts in support of his claim, which if true, would entitle him to relief." 
Orrock v. Appleton, 147 Idaho 613, 618, 213 P.3d 398, 403 (2009) (quoting 
Rincover v. Dep't of Fin., 128 Idaho 653, 656, 917 P.2d 1293, 1296 (1996)). The 
Court must "[draw] all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party." 
Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 257, 127 PJd 156, 160 (2005) (citation omitted). 
"After drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving party, the Court then 
examines whether a claim for relief has been stated." Id 
Hoffer v. City of Boise , 151 Idaho 400, --,257 P.3d 1226, 1228 (2011). 
Nowhere has this Court suggested that it would abandon decades of interpretation of the 
standard for a motion to dismiss merely because the United States Supreme Court has (by a bare 5 
to 4 majority in Ashcrofl) announced a new interpretation of Federal Rules 12(b)(6) and 8(a). 
But even under the Twombly and Iqbal decisions, the trial court must assume factual 
allegations are true and merely decide whether the plaintiff has stated a ground for relief that is 
plausible. The issue is therefore whether the Amended Complaint contains "enough facts to state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face." 550 U.S. at 570. The Woolgrowers submit that it does. 
There is nothing implausible in their claim that IDFG assumed a contractual liability and the State 
assumed a statutory liability to protect them. There is nothing implausible about the claim that the 
intent of the 1997 Letter Agreement was to ensure that the members of the industry group whose 
very livelihoods and ways of life stood to be endangered by the actions taken by IDFG would be 
protected from economic harm. There is nothing implausible about the claim that IDFG, which had 
promised to "take whatever action is necessary," was obligated to fmd grazing alternatives for the 
Woolgrowers in parts of Hells Canyon so as to reduce further losses to the bighorn sheep without 
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adversely impacting the Woolgrowers. There is nothing implausible about the assertion that this 
may be one of the exceptional cases where estoppel against a State agency is appropriate. 
IDFG attempts to ignore the issue of the proper standard on which to judge a motion to 
dismiss. As stated in the Woolgrowers' opening brief, the district court appeared to misunderstand 
that standard. It now appears that IDFG misunderstands that standard as well or assumes that this 
Court will blindly follow the misguided decisions of the United States Supreme Court. At the very 
least this Court should remand the matter to the district court for a ruling using the appropriate 
standard of review. 
B. There Is an Enforceable Contract. 
The Woolgrowers assert the existence of an enforceable contract. The existence of the 
contract may be rejected by the jury. It may even be rejected by the district court on summary 
judgment, after both parties are permitted to provide evidence on the matter. What the district court 
should not have done was to deny the possibility that an enforceable contract exists on a motion to 
dismiss without reviewing evidence or hearing testimony. 
While IDFG boldly asserts that the 1997 Letter Agreement is "nothing more than the type of 
letter commonly sent by agencies to interest groups that may be affected by agency actions," 
(Respondents' Brief at 12) such unsupported argument is unavailing on a motion to dismiss. The 
bargain between IDFG and the Wool growers is alleged in the Amended Complaint. The 
Woolgrowers agreed to support the reintroduction of bighorns if IDFG agreed to protect them 
against economic losses. That is the essence of a bargain between parties, and that allegation 
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suffices to preclude dismissal of the lawsuit. The Amended Complaint also asserts the 
consideration from both sides: the Wool growers , withdrawal of their opposition and IDFG's 
agreement to protect the Woolgrowers. The Woolgrowers did not solely agree to forebear lobbing 
the Legislature; it agreed to withdraw its opposition to the planned bighorn reintroduction in various 
forums and to support the effort. This constitutes consideration. 
IDFG contends that it did not agree to protect the domestic sheep operators from economic 
harm in the 1997 Letter Agreement. Then what was the intent of that Letter Agreement? What was 
the intent of the language in the Letter stating that IDFG agrees to "take whatever action is 
necessary to reduce further losses of bighorn sheep without adversely impacting existing domestic 
sheep operators?" What is the "whatever action" that was contemplated to be necessary to prevent 
the adverse impact on existing domestic sheep operators? 
IDFG appears to make a circular argument: IDFG admits that the 1997 Letter Agreement 
"recognizes" existing domestic sheep operations; admits that the signatories to the 1997 Letter 
Agreement "accept" the potential risk of bighorn loss when bighorns invade domestic sheep 
operations; and admits that the State Wildlife agencies (which included IDFG) "will assume" the 
responsibility for bighorn losses and further disease transmission in their respective states. Finally, 
IDFG admits that the Letter Agreement commits IDFG to "take whatever action is necessary to 
reduce further losses of bighorn sheep without adversely impacting existing domestic sheep 
operators." Yet despite that language, IDFG appears to argue that if the domestic sheep operators 
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are adversely impacted because of the reintroduction of bighorn sheep it has no responsibility to do 
anything. 
The IDFG circular argument is that, although it may well have signed that Agreement, it 
either did not intend to be bound by it or it only agreed to be responsible for its own acts. That is, if 
another member ofthe Committee, which was "interested in having the support of the Woolgrowers 
industry" and which "recognizes the existing domestic sheep operations" in the areas and accepts 
the potential risks, actually takes the adverse action threatening the domestic sheep operators, IDFG 
is not obligated to take "whatever action" is necessary to stop the adverse impact on the domestic 
operators. This is the interpretation the district court erroneously accepted in its decision, but 
nowhere in the four comers of that contract does it state that IDFG is only responsible for its own 
acts. Nowhere in the four comers of that contract is it stated that IDFG's responsibility ends if 
another member of the Committee causes the adverse impact. Moreover, the actions by the United 
States Forest Service against Shirts were not the product of some non-bighorn sheep related issue, 
but instead the direct product of the (claimed) need to reduce further losses to bighorn sheep; this 
action invoked the obligation of IDFG in the Letter Agreement to "take whatever action is 
necessary" to reduce these losses in a manner that would not adversely impact the Woolgrowers. 
As stated in the Appellants' Opening Brief, such actions that could have been taken by IDFG were 
countless, but could have included the removal of the bighorn sheep from the areas in question to 
ensure no contact between bighorn sheep and the domestic sheep owned by the Woolgrowers. This 
action would have eliminated losses of the bighorn sheep and maintained the existing grazing use 
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by the Woolgrowers. However, IDFG did none of these actions, resulting in the damages to the 
W oolgrowers. 
Apparently IDFG is stating that terms in contracts that it signs do not mean anything. It can 
agree to assume responsibility and can agree to take whatever action is necessary, but under IDFG's 
interpretation those promises mean nothing. Certainly that cannot be the proper interpretation of the 
contract or the law, at least at this early stage of this litigation. 
C. The 1997 Letter Agreement is Not Void as a Matter of Law. 
First of all, this issue is not properly before the Court as the district court did not consider 
the issue except in dicta. Thus a remand would be appropriate on the issue. 
If this Court does consider the substantive issue, there is no basis to dismiss the claim on this 
ground. It is clear that the Idaho Legislature after execution of the 1997 Letter Agreement passed 
implementing legislation in March 1997. It is too early in the case to engage in fact finding as to 
whether there are appropriated sources or other funding sources which would provide for the 
reimbursement of the W oolgrowers for the losses caused by the reintroduction of bighorn sheep. 
As IDFG itself acknowledges, it is not necessary to appropriate a specific sum where 
moneys are to be paid from a special fund or revolving fund dedicated to a particular purpose. 
(Respondents' Brief at 20.) This can be seen in this Court's decision in Leonardson v. Moon, 92 
Idaho 796,804,453 P.2d 542,550 (1969): 
An appropriation within the meaning of Section 13, Article 7, has been defined as 
"authority from the Legislature expressly given in legal form, to the proper officers, 
to pay from the public moneys a specified sum, and no more, for a specified purpose, 
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and no other." Herrick v. Gallet, supra, 35 Idaho 13,204 P 477, 478. However, from 
an examination of the authorities it appears that this element of specificness is 
necessary only when the appropriation is made payable from the general fund and is 
required solely as a protection against unlimited withdrawals from such fund under 
authority of a general appropriation. When, as here, the appropriation is made 
payable from a special fund, it is not necessary to appropriate a specific sum. Ryan v. 
Riley, 65 Cal. App. 181, 223 P. 1027, Humbert v. Dunn, 84 Cal. 57, 24 P. 111; 
Ristine v. State, 20 Ind. 328. The Act is clearly an attempt to make a continuing 
appropriation of all money that any time may be in the adjutant general's contingent 
fund; and the authorities are unanimous that, in the absence of a constitutional 
inhibition against continuing appropriations, they are valid. We have no such 
inhibition. 
Id (quoting McConnell v. Gallet, 51 Idaho 386, 390, 6 P.2d 143 144 (1931)). 
The Woolgrowers have pointed out the various funds which might be dedicated to fulfilling 
the 1997 Letter Agreement promise and the 1997 statutory intention. Specifically, Idaho Code § 
3 8-408( 5)(b) authorizes the issuance of a special bighorn sheep tag to be disposed of by lottery, the 
proceeds of which shall be deposited in the Fish & Game Expendable Trust Account. The provision 
goes on: "Monies in the account from the lottery bighorn sheep tag shall be utilized by the 
department in solving problems between bighorn sheep and domestic sheep, solving problems 
between wildlife and domestic animals or improving relationships between sportsmen and private 
landowners. " (emphasis added). 
Idaho Code § 36-108, the Fish & Game Expendable Trust Account provision, states that the 
"moneys in the account may be appropriated to the Commission to carry out the terms or conditions 
of such donation, bequest, devise, or grant .... " 
Idaho Code § 36-408(5)(b) is that appropriation as it authorizes IDFG to use the money to 
solve problems between bighorn sheep and domestic sheep. The statutes simply direct where the 
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moneys from the bighorn sheep lottery are to be placed while the IDFG determines how best to use 
those proceeds. 
IDFG acknowledges that the Wildlife Restoration Project Fund, Idaho Code § 36-1805, is 
subject to a continuous appropriation. IDFG then makes a new argument not considered by the 
district court that money in this Fund is somehow limited by federal law. IDFG also acknowledges 
that money in the fund is not exclusively derived from federal grants in aid; therefore, any federal 
limitation should not apply. While these facts appear to rebut IDFG's argument regarding 
appropriated funds, the reality is that this Court should not be dealing with those questions. First of 
all, those arguments were not brought up below by IDFG and should not be allowed for the fIrst 
time on appeal. Next, and more importantly, such arguments are not appropriate at this stage of the 
litigation before discovery is allowed on such topics as the distribution and expenditure of IDFG 
funds. For example, where the money from the bighorn sheep lottery has gone is a question that 
will be pursued in discovery. It is not a question that needs to be answered on a motion to dismiss. 
D. IDFG Should Be Estopped. 
Again, the Court should recognize, as the district court appeared to forget, that factual issues 
whether estoppel applies are not suitable for determination on a motion to dismiss. The questions 
whether there were false representations and whether IDFG was acting in a commercial or 
sovereign capacity are fact intensive and the Wool growers had no opportunity to discover and argue 
those facts before the district court. 
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The district court cannot state as a matter of law that the reintroduction of the bighorn sheep 
was carried out in a sovereign capacity. The Woolgrowers recognize that wild game within the 
State belong to the people in their sovereign capacity. Sherwood v. Stephens, 13 Idaho 399, 403,90 
P. 345, 346 (1907). But that case and all of the Idaho case law cited by IDFG deal with native wild 
game, not reintroduction of bighorn sheep from out of state and even out of the United States. The 
sheep put into the Hells Canyon area are not native animals which need to be protected. They are 
animals placed in Idaho for the purposes of tourism and hunting and other commercial enterprises. 
IDFG argued those economic benefits when it was attempting to gather support for the 
reintroduction effort. It cannot now come before this Court denying the commercial aspects of the 
reintroduction effort. 
IDFG cites Moerman v. State of California, 21 Cal. Rptr.2d 329 (Cal. App. 1993), for the 
proposition that reintroduction of wild animals is a sovereign function. (Appellees' brief at 28). 
IDFG neglects to note that the Moerman case is a "physical taking" case; that California as 
compared to Idaho "does not own wild animals," id. at 333; and that the elk involved in Moerman 
were simply relocated from another area in California unlike the bighorn sheep in this case which 
were relocated from out of state and out of the United States. Moreover, a single decision from a 
lower appellate court in another state does not constitute precedent for this Court. 
Even if IDFG were not acting in a proprietary capacity, estoppel may nevertheless be 
applicable under certain limited circumstances against a governmental entity acting in its sovereign 
capacity. Brandt v. State of Idaho, 126 Idaho 101, 878 P.2d 800 (Ct.App. 1994); see also City of 
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Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway Dist., 126 Idaho 145, 151, 879 P.2d 1078, 1084 
(1994) (estoppel may be used against a highway district in order to prevent manifest injustice). The 
Woolgrowers assert that here 'justice and fair play" require the application of estoppel in order to 
prevent "manifest injustice." Specifically, IDFG and the State cannot represent to the Woolgrowers 
in 1997 that the Woolgrowers will be protected from economic hardship arising from the 
reintroduction of big hom sheep in return for the Woolgrowers' support of the reintroduction effort 
and then ten years later when the economic hardship actually occurs assert there really was no 
agreement and in any event they really do not need to live up to their promises. 
The IDFG brief does not deal with these cases or with the exception to the general rule that 
estoppel cannot be applied against the government in its sovereign capacity. The district court did 
not consider whether the exception applied either. 
Instead, IDFG in its brief attempts to argue that the application of estoppel in this case 
would "bind the state to promises or commitments that are not authorized by statute." (Appellees' 
Brief at 29). This argument ignores the fact that the Idaho Legislature at the time the 1997 Letter 
Agreement was being executed was aware of that agreement and passed legislation relating to that 
Letter Agreement. How can IDFG ignore the amendment to Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D)? There 
can be no doubt that that statute was intended to embody the agreement from the Letter Agreement 
and also to authorize the commitments made by IDFG to the Woolgrowers. 
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E. The Amended Complaint States a Valid Statutory Claim. 
As already discussed, the Idaho Legislature enacted an amendment to the Code upon 
execution of the Letter Agreement between IDFG and the Woolgrowers. That statute, Idaho Code § 
36-106(e)(5)(D), announces the policy of the State ofIdaho recognizing domestic sheep operations 
and accepting on behalf of the State of Idaho the risk when bighorn sheep invade domestic sheep 
operations. What does "recognizing" existing domestic sheep operations mean? What does 
"accepting" the risk ofthe bighorn sheep relocation mean? The statute can only mean that the State 
of Idaho agreed either to forestall economic harm to the Woolgrowers or that the State of Idaho 
through IDFG would provide remedies for any such harm that occurred. Whether those remedies 
are provided through a new appropriation, through one of the custodial funds held for the benefit of 
IDFG or by provision of forage or alternative grazing areas, it is clear that the Legislature intended 
to protect the Woolgrowers. 
F. IDFG is Not Entitled to Attorney's Fees. 
The Woolgrowers believe that they are entitled to an award of attorneys' fees as IDFG has 
unreasonably attempted to escape its contractual and statutory responsibilities. Even if the Court 
disagrees that the 1997 Letter Agreement actually means something, the Woolgrowers submit that 
IDFG is not entitled to attorneys' fees as the Woolgrowers did not act without a reasonable basis in 
fact or law. Certainly the Woolgrowers have a strong factual argument regarding the Agreement 
and the statutes passed in conjunction with that Agreement. The Woolgrowers also submit that their 
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legal arguments are reasonably sound. At the least, they present a reasonable argument both 
regarding the appropriate standard of review that the district court ignored and the substantive issues 
regarding the contractual and statutory obligations of IDFG. Accordingly, the prerequisites for an 
award of attorneys' fees under Idaho Code § 12-117 against the Woolgrowers have not been met. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This case is before this Court on review of a grant of a Rule 12(b)( 6) motion to dismiss. 
Much of what IDFG argued in its brief is irrelevant, as the trial court's role in considering a 
motion to dismiss is narrow and circumscribed by the pleadings. The case should be remanded 
to allow the parties to develop a factual record to enable a fact finder to determine the meaning 
and implication of the 1997 Letter Agreement and the statutory duties imposed by the Idaho 
Legislature. The Woolgrowers respectfully request the Court to reverse the district court's 
decision and remand the case for further proceedings. 
DATED this --£ day of November, 2011. 
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